We consider the problem of sharing water among agents located along a river, who have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. The benefit of consuming an amount of water is given by a continuous, concave benefit function. In this setting, a solution efficiently distributes water over the agents and wastes no money. Since we deal with concave benefit functions, it is not always possible to follow the usual approach and define a cooperative river game. Instead, we directly introduce axioms for solutions on the water allocation problem. Besides three basic axioms, we introduce two independence axioms to characterize the downstream incremental solution, introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), and a new solution, called the UTI incremental solution. Both solutions can be implemented by allocating the water optimally among the agents and monetary transfers between the agents.
Introduction
In this paper, we consider the problem of sharing water among agents -e.g., countries, cities, firms -located along a river. As the number of agents involved in sharing (international) river water is usually small, and formal (international) water exchanges are scarce, trade in river water normally takes place by the signing of contracts between the parties involved. These contracts directly specify the amount of water to be delivered and the amount of money that has to be paid for this water -see Dinar, Rosegrant and MeinzenDick (1997) and its references. Cooperative game theory deals with strategic situations in which the outcome of one agent's choice depends on choices made by other agents, and the agents making the choices are able to sign binding bi-or multilateral contracts to enforce cooperation. For this reason, cooperative game theory is one of the main tools used in modeling (international) water resource issues -see Parrachino, Dinar and Patrone (2006) for an overview. Ambec and Sprumont (2002) introduce a cooperative game that models a river situation in which a group of agents is located along a single-stream river from upstream to downstream. Each agent is assumed to have quasi-linear preferences over river water and money, where the benefit of consuming an amount of water is given by a differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave benefit function. An allocation of the river water among the agents is efficient when it maximizes the total sum of benefits. To sustain an efficient water allocation, the agents can compensate each other by paying monetary transfers. Every water allocation and transfer schedule yields a welfare distribution, where the utility of an agent is equal to its benefit from water consumption plus its monetary transfer, which can be negative. By modeling the river situation as a cooperative game, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) find our what monetary transfers should be performed in order to realize a fair welfare distribution. They suggest the downstream incremental solution as a welfare distribution that satisfies both core lower bounds and aspiration upper bounds. This downstream incremental solution can be seen as the marginal contribution vector of their cooperative game corresponding to the ordering of agents along the river, from upstream to downstream. Comment: Maybe this is confusing? In terms of hierarchical outcome the downstream agent is the top agent. Ambec and Ehlers (2008) , Khmelnitskaya (2010) and van den Brink, van der Laan and Moes (2012) all generalize the model of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) in some specific way. Ambec and Ehlers (2008) allow for satiable agents by assuming that the benefit function of each agent is differentiable and strictly concave, but not necessarily increasing (i.e., the benefit function can be decreasing beyond some satiation point). Khmelnitskaya (2010) considers rivers that have a so-called sink-tree or rooted-tree structure, allowing multiple springs or deltas. Finally, van den Brink, van der Laan and Moes (2012) study rivers with multiple springs (as in Khmelnitskaya (2010) ) and satiable agents (as in Ambec and Ehlers (2008) ), and suggest a new class of solutions based on a water distribution principle known as Territorial Integration of all Basin States (TIBS). For the original single-stream model, van den Brink, van der Laan and Vasil'ev (2007) propose several other solutions, amongst which the upstream incremental solution being the marginal contribution vector of the 'Ambec-Sprumont cooperative game' correspondig to the ordering of the agents from downstream to upstream, while Wang (2011) proposes a solution in which water trading is restricted to pairs of neighboring agents.
Our paper adds to this growing literature in three ways. First, we weaken the assumption of Ambec and Ehlers (2008) (and, therefore , also the assumption of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) ) on the benefit functions by only requiring continuity and concavity. Second, we characterize the downstream incremental solution for the single-stream model by introducing independence of downstream benefits, which states that the utility payoff of an agent does not depend on the benefits of downstream agents. Third, we propose and characterize a new solution for the single-stream model, called the UTI incremental solution, by using independence of upstream benefits stating that the utility payoff of an agent does not depend on the benefits of upstream agents. Fourth, we apply the both solutions to the particular situation in which every agent has constant marginal benefit, equal to one, up to a satiation point, and marginal benefit equal to zero thereafter. We find that, in this case, both solutions can be implemented without monetary transfers between the agents. As a result, this can be applied to the river claim problem of Ansink and Weikard (2012) where the full benefit functions of the agents are unknown and each agent has only specified a single claim on water from the river.
The downstream incremental solution is based on the international water law principle of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (shortly ATS), or the Harmon doctrine, which states that every country has the absolute sovereignty over the inflow of the river on its own territory.
1 The solution satisfies the (core) stability condition that for every coalition of agents (countries) along the river, the total payoff is at least equal to the total benefit that they can obtain by allocating the water inflow on their own territory optimally amongst each other. However, the Harmon doctrine is not compatible with other principles of international water law, such as the principle of Unlimited Territorial Integrity (shortly UTI), saying that a state has the right to demand the natural flow of an international watercourse into its territory that is undiminished by its upstream states (stated in the rules of the Helsinki Convention on water rights of the International Law Association (1966)).
1 In 1895, Mexico complained that the USA extracted too much water from the Rio Grande, causing shortages in Mexico. Asked for his opinion, Judson Harmon, the Attorney General of the US Department of Justice, responded that 'the US is under no obligation to Mexico to restrain its use of the Rio Grande because its absolute sovereignty within its own territory' (McCaffrey, 1996, p.563) .
The UTI incremental solution is based on the principle that for every downstream coalition (a coalition that for a particular agent consists of this agent and all its downstream agents) the total payoff is at least equal to the total benefit that they can obtain by allocating all water inflows (on their own territory and the territories of all other (upstream) agents) optimally amongst each other. In the literature mentioned above the river situation is modeled as a cooperative game based on the ATS principle. In contrast to this literature in this paper we avoid the detour of modeling a cooperative game. There are several reasons to do so. First, we allow for benefit functions that are concave, but not necessarily strictly concave. So, it might be that the benefit is increasing up to a certain lower satiation level, afterwards be constant up to an upper satiation level, and decreasing from then on. An agent with such a benefit function is indifferent between any consumption of water between its lower satiation level and its upper satiation level. Therefore an additional assumption on the behavior of such an agent has to be made, because this behavior might determine the amount of water available for its downstream agents. Second, the ATS principle is conflicting with the UTI principle. So, any welfare distribution derived from a solution of the cooperative game satisfying ATS will violate the UTI principle and so the new UTI incremental solution proposed in this paper can not be derived from a game reflecting the ATS principle. Third, while most axioms used in the literature are also derived from water distribution principles, they are ultimately axioms on cooperative games and not on water allocation problems. This often leads to frictions when trying to interpret the cooperative game axioms in terms of water allocation. Instead we immediately impose axioms on the class of all river sharing problems with the advantage that the axioms can be directly interpreted in terms of principles for water (benefit) allocation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the single-stream river sharing model of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) and weaken the assumptions on the benefit functions of that model. In Section 3, we introduce three basic axioms on river sharing problems that are weak versions of axioms that are known in the literature. In Section 4, we introduce independence of downstream benefits and show that, together with the three basic axioms of Section 3, it characterizes the downstream incremental solution. In Section 5, we consider independence of upstream benefits and introduce the new UTI incremental solution that is characterized by this axiom and the three basic axioms. In Section 6, we apply the two solutions to the case where every agent has constant marginal benefit of one up to a satiation point and marginal benefit of zero thereafter. We conclude in Section 7.
River problems with concave benefit functions
Many researchers in economics and game theory have addressed water issues, see for instance Dinar, Ratner and Yaron (1992) and Dinar et al. (2005) for extensive surveys. An important part of this research focuses on the problem of allocating water from a common resource that has to be shared by several users, for instance allocating water in case of boundary rivers or in case of common groundwater aquifers. In contrast to such common pool situations, a feature peculiar to international rivers is the one-directionality of the water flow imposing, in some sense, dominance of upstream agents over downstream agents. International water law, as laid down in the Helsinki rules on water rights of the International Law Association (1966) ) and in the Law on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses of the UN Convention (1997), does neither recognize claims by upstream countries on the water caught on its territory, nor downstream nations claims of historical rights, which makes the application of negotiation theory even more difficult.
In their paper 'Sharing a river', Ambec and Sprumont (2002) consider the problem of finding a 'fair' distribution of the welfare resulting from allocating the inflows of water into an international, or transboundary, river to the agents located along the river. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents along the river, in the sequel also called countries, numbered successively from upstream to downstream, and let e i ≥ 0 be the inflow of water on the territory of agent i, i = 1, . . . , n. Because of the one-directionality of the water flow from upstream to downstream, every agent can be assigned, at most, the water inflow on the territories of itself and its upstream agents, but the water inflow downstream of some agent cannot be allocated to this agent. Therefore, a water allocation x ∈ IR n + assigns an amount of water x i to agent i, i ∈ N , under the constraints
i.e., x ∈ IR n + is a water allocation if, for every agent j, the sum of the water assignments x 1 , . . . , x j is, at most, equal to the sum of the inflows e 1 , . . . , e j . Further, agents can make monetary compensations to other agents for receiving water. A compensation scheme t ∈ IR n gives a (possibly negative) monetary compensation t i to agent i, i ∈ N , under the
Each agent i is assumed to have a quasi-linear utility function which assigns to every pair (x i , t i ), with x i ∈ IR + , the amount of water allocated to i and t i ∈ IR the monetary compensation to i, the utility 
e i , j = 1, . . . , n, and 2) and the compensation scheme t ∈ IR n + is budget balanced: Ambec and Sprumont (2002) assume that every benefit function b i : IR + → IR is an increasing and strictly concave function, which is differentiable at every x i > 0 with derivative going to infinity as x i tends to zero. Under this assumption, the maximization problem (2.2) has a unique solution x * . We say that z ∈ IR n is a welfare distribution if there exists a Pareto efficient pair (x * , t) such that
Hence, a welfare distribution z shares the maximum attainable welfare
) amongst the agents by allocating x * i to agent i, i ∈ N , and implementing a budget balanced monetary compensation scheme t. Reversely, notice that for the optimal allocation x * , every budget balanced compensation scheme t induces a welfare distribution. Ambec and Sprumont (2002) (N, e, b) . To characterize this solution, based on the ATS principle Ambec and Sprumont require a welfare distribution z to satisfy the stability condition that for every upstream coalition {1, . . . , j}, j ∈ N , the total welfare to its players is at least equal to v j (e, b).
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According to the UTI principle a state has the right to demand that the natural flow is undiminished by its upstream states. Instead of using this as a lower bound requirement for downstream coalitions, in Ambec and Sprumont this is used as an upper bound on the welfare distribution, by requiring that for every coalition S of agents, the total welfare is bounded from above by its aspiration level, being the maximum welfare the agents in S can obtain by distributing optimally the water inflow on the territories of all agents 1, 2, . . . , s,where s is the most downstream agent in S. For an upstream coalition {1, . . . , j}, j ∈ N , this requires that its total welfare is bounded from above by the maximum welfare that the coalition can obtain by optimally distributing their own water amongst themselves. Thus, the aspiration level property requires that for each j, the total welfare b) . It follows that the stability requirement and the aspiration level property together require that
for every j ∈ N , and thus uniquely determine the welfare distribution given by (2.3). Ambec and Ehlers (2008) generalize the basic river game described above by allowing for satiable agents. This means that they weaken the assumption on the benefits in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) by relaxing the requirement that the benefit function is strictly increasing. Instead, they assume that every benefit function b i : IR + → IR is a strictly concave function, differentiable at every x i > 0 with derivative going to infinity as x i tends to zero. Under this assumption, it is possible that for some point c i > 0, called the satiation point of agent i, the benefit is increasing from x i = 0 to c i , reaches its maximum value at c i , and is decreasing for x i > c i . Ambec and Ehlers (2008) show that also for river situations with satiable agents, the downstream incremental solution d (N, e, b) is still well-defined by (2.3), and is uniquely determined by requiring for every upstream coalition both stability and the aspiration level property.
In this paper, we further weaken the assumptions of Ambec and Ehlers (2008) and, therefore, also those of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) , by allowing the benefit functions to be concave instead of strictly concave. Moreover, we weaken differentiability to continuity. 
, and decreasing when x i > c i . In the latter case, the point c i is the satiation point of agent i. Therefore, agent i reaches its highest benefit at c i and all water consumption levels between c i and c i also yield this maximal benefit. However, water consumption higher than c i yields a lower benefit than the benefit obtained at c i . We allow for c i = 0 and c i = ∞ (meaning that b i is constant for x i ≥ c i ≥ 0). In particular, this allows for
Basic axioms for fair welfare distribution
In this section, we first formulate three basic axioms concerning the distribution of welfare in river situations, where the preferences of the agents over water are described by benefit functions satisfying Assumption 2.1. Let W N denote the collection of all river situations
In the sequel, the component
Under Assumption 2.1, the maximization problems (2.2), respectively (2.4), do not necessarily have a unique solution, but are still well-defined. Given a river problem (N, e, b), we define
with y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) a solution of (2.2), as the total welfare that is obtained from an optimal allocation of the water. As we have seen before, stability reflects the ATS principle that each agent is the legal owner of its own water and, therefore, stability puts a severe requirement on the welfare distribution and so it might contradict other water principles such as the UTI principle, saying that a (downstream) state has the right to demand the natural flow of an international watercourse into its territory that is undiminished by its upstream states or the weaker principle of Limited Territorial Sovereignty (UN Convention 1997), shortly LTS, saying that there exist legal restrictions on every state's use of the water. One therefore might argue that stability is a too strong requirement. In the next two axioms, we weaken stability. First, the efficiency axiom for a solution f states that the total sum of payoffs equals the total welfare in an optimal water allocation and so it implies stability for the coalition of all agents.
Axiom 3.1 (Efficiency) For every river problem
For a single agent the ATS principle requires the individual rationality condition that an agent gets at least a payoff equal to the highest benefit it can obtain by consuming at most its own water inflow. Taking into account UTI and LTS, in the next axiom individual rationality is weakened to a lower bound property on the individual payoffs that only requires that each agent gets, at least, a payoff equal to the benefit of consuming a zero amount of water. 
Next we consider the aspiration level axiom as used by Ambec and Sprumont (2002) to put for every coalition an an upper bound on the total payoff. For an upstream coalition {1, . . . , j}, j ∈ N , it requires that the total payoff to such a coalition is at most equal to the highest total benefit it can obtain from their own water inflows, thus the upper bound on its total payoff equals the under bound required by stability. So, when the downstream agents have higher marginal benefits of the use of water than the agents in an upstream coalition, the aspiration level axiom implies that the upstream coalition cannot be rewarded for the positive externalities it generates for its downstream agents when letting pass some of its water inflow to the downstream agents in order to maximize the total welfare of the grand coalition of all agents. The aspiration level axiom states that a downstream coalition is at most compensated for its loss of welfare when it let pass some of its water to its downstream agents, but all all the gain in benefits from optimally allocating the water over all agents goes to the downstream agents. One might wonder why a coalition of upstream agents will agree with such an outcome. We therefore weaken the aspiration level axiom by requiring this axiom only for individual agents, but not for coalitions. For an upstream coalition {1, . . . , j} the weak aspiration level property stated below requires that the total payoff to such a coalition is at most equal to
, being the sum of their individual aspiration levels, which might be substantially higher than the maximum welfare that they can obtain by allocating optimally their own water inflows amongst themselves, being the upper bound required by the aspiration level property. So, the weak aspiration level property allows that an upstream coalition is rewarded for positive externalities it might generate on its downstream agents.
Axiom 3.3 (Weak aspiration level property) For every river problem
Notice that under Assumption 2.1 this benefit of consuming at most its own water inflow is at least equal to the benefit of consuming a zero amount of water. 4 Note that, under increasing benefit functions, we can write this inequality as
In the following sections, we add independence axioms that, together with the axioms of this section, characterize certain water allocation rules.
Independence of downstream benefits and the downstream incremental solution
In this and the following section we state to axioms that require that the welfare of agents does not depend on the benefit functions of certain other agents. A first reason to require this is that benefit functions are, in general, private information that agents may be reluctant to share. Therefore, a way to circumvent the problem of misrepresentation of benefit functions is to require the welfare allocated to an agent by a solution to be independent of the benefit functions of the other agents. Stated differently, if some agents misrepresent there benefit functions to obtain higher shares in the welfare, this would not affect the other agents. However, since independence of the benefit functions of all the other agents is a very strong requirement, we divide the analysis in two parts: independence of downstream benefits and independence of upstream benefits. A second reason to require independency of benefits could be that an agent along the river should not be held responsible for changes in the benefits of other agents, see Fleurbaey (2008) . If the demand for river water of a country increases, for instance because it develops a new irrigation technique or starts large-scale farming activity on its territory, one might wonder whether this this might harm other agents along the river? Also the Prior Appropriation principle, being in the rules of the Helsinki Convention on water rights of the International Law Association (1966), states that a country that first make use of some quantity of water from an international watercourse has the right to the continued use of the water, also when the demands of other countries increase. We establish this in the independence axioms. The next axiom of independence of downstream benefits states that the payoff of an agent does not depend on the benefit functions of its downstream agents.
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Axiom 4.1 (Independence of downstream benefits) For every two river problems
This axiom together with the three basic axioms of Section 3 uniquely characterize the downstream incremental solution of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) which assigns to every river problem (N, e, b) e, b) . 
Efficiency, the induction hypothesis, (4.5) and (4.6), then, determine that
Since (b i ) j (x) = 0 for every x ∈ IR + and j ∈ {i + 1, . . . , n}, similar as above, it follows
. Therefore, with (4.7), we have (N, e, b) . Finally, independence of downstream benefits
b). 2
Notice that the welfare levels obtained by solving the welfare maximization problems (2.4), fully determine the downstream incremental solution and that these problems are well-defined when the benefit functions satisfy Assumption 2.1. Therefore, we do not need to make any additional assumption concerning agents with concave, but not strictly concave, benefit functions.
We show logical independence of the axioms in Theorem 4.2 by giving four alternative solutions, each of these solutions only satisfying three of the four axioms.
The solution f i (N, e, b) = b i (0) for all i ∈ N and all river problems (N, e, b) satisfies
the lower bound property, the weak aspiration level property, and independence of downstream benefits. It does not satisfy efficiency. e, b) assigns to every agent, except the most downstream agent, its highest benefit as if it had access to all water inflows, while the benefit of the most downstream agent is obtained by subtracting all these benefits from the total benefit in an efficient allocation. This solution satisfies efficiency, independence of downstream benefits, and the weak aspiration level property. It does not satisfy the lower bound property.
The solution
f i (N, e, b) = max x i ≤ ∑ j∈N e j b i (x i ) for all i ∈ N \ {n}, and f n (N, e, b) = v n (e, b)− ∑ n−1 j=1 f i (N,
for all i ∈ N \{n} satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, and independence of downstream benefits. It does not satisfy the weak aspiration level property.
4. The downstream solution, as will be defined in Section 5, satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, and the weak aspiration level property. It does not satisfy independence of downstream benefits.
Independence of upstream benefits and the UTI incremental solution
As a counterpart of independence of downstream benefits, we now consider independence of upstream benefits, where the payoff of an agent does not depend on the benefit functions of its upstream agents.
Axiom 5.1 (Independence of upstream benefits) For every two river problems
Similarly as in the case of independence of downstream benefits, there is a unique solution that satisfies independence of upstream benefits and the three basic axioms from Section 3. This is the solution s, which assigns to a river situation (N, e, b) ∈ W N the welfare distribution s (N, e, b) given by 
. . , n, and x
As noticed before, the UTI principle states that a country has the right to demand that the natural flow is undiminished by its upstream states. According to this UTI principle, the agents of a downstream coalition {j, . . . , n} can use their own water inflows and also all the water inflows on the territories of all agents upstream of j in maximizing their welfare in (5.9). Thus, for a downstream coalition {j, . . . , n}, the maximization problem (5.9) optimally allocates the inflows e 1 , . . . , e n amongst the agents in the coalition, given the unidirectionality of the water flow. On the other hand, the solution s yields to any downstream coalition its aspiration level welfare, while it assigns to every agent its marginal contribution to the aspiration level welfare of its downstream agents along the river according to the UTI principle. We therefore call s the UTI incremental solution.
Notice that, for j = 1, the maximization problem (5.9) is again equal to problem (2.2), so that w e, b) and thus, also the UTI incremental solution is efficient. Comparing the downstream incremental solution with the UTI incremental solution, the latter solution is characterized by replacing the independence of downstream benefits by independence of upstream benefits.
b). From this, it follows that
∑ n i=1 s i (N, e, b) = w 1 (e, b) = W (N,
Theorem 5.2 A solution f on the class W N of river problems is equal to the downstream solution s if, and only if, f satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, the weak aspiration level property and independence of upstream benefits.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the downstream solution satisfies these four axioms. Therefore, it only remains to be shown that the four axioms determine a unique solution. Let (N, e, b) ∈ W N be a river problem and suppose that solution f satisfies the four axioms. We apply induction on the labels of the agents, starting with the most downstream agent n. We first determine f n (N, e, b) . Consider the modified river problem (N, e, b n ) with (b n ) n = b n and (b n ) j (x) = 0 for all x ∈ IR + and j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. The lower bound
. . , n − 1}, while the weak aspiration level property requires that
Thus, we conclude that f j (N, e, b n ) = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. By efficiency, we have that
Since (b n ) j (x) = 0 for every x ∈ IR + and j ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, and ( Independence of upstream benefits and the induction hypothesis imply that
value, while independence of lower valuations characterizes the equal division solution. In bankruptcy or rationing problems, independence on higher claims is used to characterize the constrained equal awards rule, while independence on lower claims is used to characterize the constrained equal losses rule, see, e.g. Moulin (2003) .
Efficiency, the induction hypothesis, (5.11) and (5.12), then, determine that (N, e, b) . Finally, independence of upstream benefits implies that (N, e, b) . 2
In the welfare maximization problems (5.9), the agents in the downstream coalition {j, . . . , n} are entitled to get the total water inflow ∑ i∈N e i . When some of the water is allocated to other agents according to the downstream solution, the most downstream agent is fully compensated for its loss of benefits by monetary compensations of the other agents. Consequently, the downstream solution does not satisfy upstream stability and, thus, violates the ATS doctrine.
We show logical independence of the axioms in Theorem 5.2 by giving four alternative solutions. (N, e, b) = b i (0) for all i ∈ N and all river problems (N, e, b) satisfies the lower bound property, the weak aspiration level property, and independence of upstream benefits. It does not satisfy efficiency. e, b) assigns to every agent, except the most upstream agent, its highest benefit as if it had access to all water inflows, while the benefit of the most upstream agent is obtained by subtracting all these benefits from the total benefit in an efficient allocation. This solution satisfies efficiency, independence of upstream benefits, and the weak aspiration level property. It does not satisfy the lower bound property.
The solution f i
The solution
f i (N, e, b) = max x i ≤ ∑ j∈N e j b i (x i ) for all i ∈ N \ {1} and f 1 (N, e, b) = v n (e, b) − ∑ n j=2 f i (N,
assigns to every agent, except the most upstream agent, its benefit from consuming zero water, and assigns all the surplus to the most upstream agent. This solution satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, and independence of upstream benefits. It does not satisfy the weak aspiration level property.
4. From Theorem 4.2, it follows that the downstream incremental solution satisfies efficiency, the lower bound property, and the weak aspiration level property. It does not satisfy independence of upstream benefits.
A special case: the claims model
In this section, we consider the particular case where every country has the same constant marginal benefit b up to its satiation point c i and has constant benefit at every water consumption above its satiation point. Formally, for every i ∈ N , there exists a c i > 0 such that
(6.14)
Without loss of generality we take b = 1. We now consider the two solutions studied in Sections 4 and 5 for the case of such benefit functions within the model considered in this paper. For benefit functions of type (6.14), it straightforwardly follows that
and, successively,
Substituting this in the equations (2.3), we obtain that the downstream incremental solution d is given by (2.3). and recursively for j = 2, . . . , n, 16) by using the fact that, by definition,
The downstream incremental solution can be implemented by assigning, to each upstream coalition {1, . . . , j}, as much water as possible given the uni-directionality of the water flows and under the constraint that no country gets water above its satiation point. We conclude that, when each country has a benefit function of type (6.14), monetary compensations are not needed to implement the downstream incremental solution. We now consider the UTI incremental solution s given by (5.8). To avoid notational burden, in the following, we assume that
(6.17)
Note that this can be done without loss of generality. On the contrary, suppose that (6.17) does not hold for j = n. Then, e n ≥ c n and the water inflow at agent n is, at least, as high as its satiation point. Then, this country does not need to get water from its upstream countries. Because also its excess of water, e n − c n , cannot be assigned to its upstream countries, in this case, country n stands alone and does not affect the welfare of the other agents. Therefore, it is sufficient to consider the agents 1, . . . , n−1. Similarly, suppose that the condition holds for all agents i > j and not for agent j. Then, e j ≥ c j + ∑ n i=j+1 (c i − e i ) and the water inflow at agent j is high enough to assign agent j and all its downstream agents water up to their satiation points and, so, the water consumptions of these agents do not affect the upstream agents. In this case, we have to solve two independent water distribution problems, one for the upstream coalition {1, . . . , j − 1} and the other for the downstream coalition {j, . . . , n}. Therefore, the assumption can be made without loss of generality, as already mentioned. Under (6.17), it straightforwardly follows that, for benefit functions of type (6.14),
By (6.17), we have that w n (e, b) ≥ e n and, then,
and, again by (6.17), we have that w n−1 (e, b) ≥ e n−1 + e n . Continuing, it successively follows from j = n − 2 to j = 1 that
Substituting this in the equations (5.8), we obtain 18) and, recursively, from j = n − 1 to j = 1, 19) using the fact that, by definition,
. . , n − 1. From these expressions, it follows that the UTI incremental solution can be implemented by assigning, to each downstream coalition {j, . . . , n}, as much water as possible given the uni-directionality of the water flows and under the constraint that no country gets water above its satiation point. Again, when each country has a benefit function of type (6.14), monetary compensations are not needed to implement the UTI incremental solution.
Notice that the analysis above holds for any b > 0, by taking b ̸ = 1 just all payoffs are multiplied by b. However, the analysis does not hold anymore when the constant marginal benefits differ across countries. For instance, for n = 2 and taking b 1 (x 1 ) = x 1 , b 2 (x 2 ) = 2x 2 , c 1 > e 1 and c 2 > e 1 + e 2 , the total welfare is maximized by allocating all the water to agent 2, resulting in a total welfare 2(e 1 + e 2 ). However, the downstream incremental solution yields payoff e 1 to agent 1, which requires that country 2 makes a monetary payment equal to e 1 to country 1. in contrast, when for instance b 1 (x 1 ) = 2x 1 , b 2 (x 2 ) = x 2 , c 1 > e 1 , c 2 > e 1 and e 2 = 0, the total welfare is maximized by allocating e 1 fully to agent 1, resulting in a total welfare 2e 1 . However, the UTI incremental solution agent 1 yields payoff e 1 to agent 2, which requires that country 1 makes a monetary payment equal to e 1 to country 2.
The particular case that all countries have the same marginal benefit equal to one up to some satiation point is of special interest because its similarity with the river claim problem of Ansink and Weikard (2012) , who model the river as a triple (N, e, c) , where N = {1, . . . , n} is again the set of agents along the river, numbered successively from upstream to downstream, and e i ≥ 0 is the inflow of water on the territory of agent i, i = 1, . . . , n. Instead of a profile of benefit functions, the vector c = (c i ) i∈N is such that c i ≥ 0 is the nonnegative claim on water of agent i and the benefit of a country is equal to its amount of water. Clearly, this means that each country has a benefit function of type (6.14). However, for the class of river claim situations, Ansink and Weikard (2012) do not allow for monetary compensations amongst the countries. So, the problem is to find a fair distribution of the water inflows amongst the countries, without monetary compensations, given their claims and the uni-directionality of the water flows. Since the downstream incremental and UTI incremental solutions do not require monetary compensations when the benefit functions are of type (6.14), these two solutions for the general river problem with benefit functions satisfying Assumption 2.1, also provide solutions on the class of river claim problems.
Note that in (6.15) and (6.16) (respectively (6.18) and (6.19)), the downstream incremental (respectively downstream) solution is defined on the river claim problem in the sense that, besides the claims, they do not depend on the benefit functions. In the remaining of this section we translate our axioms into the context of river claim problems and show that they characterize these two solutions. We denote by C N the class of all water claim problems. First, efficiency requires that we do not waste water that could be used by another agent.
Axiom 6.1 (Efficiency) For every river claim problem (N, e, c) 
The lower bound property now means that no agent can consume a negative amount of water.
Axiom 6.2 (Lower bound property) For every river claim problem
The weak aspiration level property states that no agent can consume more than its claim.
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Axiom 6.3 (Weak aspiration level property) For every river claim problem (N, e, c) 
The independence of upstream and downstream benefits are straightforward translated in terms of claims. (N, e, c) . 
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we considered the problem of sharing water among agents located along a river. We adapted the model of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) by weakening the assumption on the benefit functions of the agents. Using five different axioms, we were able to characterize two solutions for this model, the known downstream incremental solution and the new UTI incremental solution, differing only in an independence axiom. According to the downstream incremental solution the payoff of an agent does not depend on benefit functions of downstream agents, while according to the UTI incremental solution the payoff of an agent does not depend on benefit functions of upstream agents. We also saw that, when we apply the two solutions to the particular case that every agent has constant marginal benefit equal to one up to a satiation point, and marginal benefit of zero thereafter, both solutions can be implemented without monetary transfers between the agents. This means that, when countries along an international river only state a claim on the river water and are not willing to transfer money to each other, these two solutions are viable.
We conclude with some remarks on the cooperative game approach in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) and Ambec and Ehlers (2008) . To find a 'fair' welfare distribution, under the assumption that every benefit function b i : IR + → IR is an increasing and strictly concave function, which is differentiable at every x i > 0 with derivative going to infinity as x i tends to zero, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) model the river problem as a cooperative game on the player set N of agents along the river. The game is based on the ATS principle by assuming that every coalition of players is in full control of its own water and can guarantee itself all the benefits of allocating their own water optimally amongst themselves. This gives the characteristic function of the game, yielding to every coalition a worth equal to the highest total welfare that the coalition can guarantee itself. Hence, the worth of a coalition {h, h + 1, . . . , j}, 1 ≤ h ≤ j ≤ n, of consecutive agents is equal to the total benefit that these agents can obtain by solving the welfare maximization problem . . . , j, and x i ≥ 0, i = h, . . . , j. (7.23) Under the assumptions made on the benefit functions in Ambec and Sprumont (2002) , for each h, j ∈ N , this maximization problem has a unique solution. However, only coalitions of consecutive agents along the river can cooperate. A coalition of non-consecutive agents consisting of two (or more) consecutive subsets of agents would never transfer water from the upstream part to the downstream part, because the increasing benefit functions would make that all water sent from the upstream to the downstream agents would be taken by the agents in-between the two parts. A coalition of non-consecutive agents can guarantee themselves a total welfare equal to the sum of these worths of their biggest consecutive parts.
The existence of satiation points under the assumption of Ambec and Ehlers (2008) (every benefit function is strictly concave, and differentiable at every x i > 0 with derivative going to infinity as x i tends to zero) has serious consequences for the corresponding cooperative game. As argued above, without satiation points only coalitions of consecutive agents can cooperate. However, with satiable agents it might be profitable for a non-consecutive coalition of agents to transfer water from its upstream part to its downstream part. Although some of this flow might be taken by the in-between agents, these agents will only take water up to their satiation points. In this way, part of the flow might reach the downstream agents, possibly rendering cooperation between the two parts of the coalition profitable. This causes positive externalities on the in-between agents. As a result, the worth that can be obtained by a coalition depends on the behavior of the other agents, leading to a more complicated game, a so-called game in partition function form. Nevertheless, for every j ∈ N , the upstream coalition {1, . . . , j} is externality free, i.e., the maximum welfare that such a coalition can obtain by optimally allocating their own water inflows amongst themselves does not depend on the behavior of the agents downstream of j, and these maximum welfare levels are still given by the worths v j (e, b), j = 1, . . . , n, at the solutions of the welfare maximization problems (7.23) with h = 1. In the underlying paper, under Assumption 2.1, the corresponding cooperative game (even in partition function form) is not well defined unless we make additional assumptions on the water consumption of agents that have concave, but not strictly concave, benefit functions. Consider again a non-consecutive coalition consisting of a consecutive upstream part and a consecutive downstream part. Assume that some agent j between these two parts has a benefit function with a satiation point c j and a point c j > c j such that its benefit is constant between c j and c j and decreasing thereafter. In this case, the cooperative game is not well-defined without an additional assumption about the water consumption of agent j when the water flow sent by the upstream part to the downstream part becomes so big that the availability of water for agent j exceeds its satiation point c j . On one hand, one might argue that agent j should not use more than c j since consuming more than c j gives him no more benefit while more downstream agents might derive positive benefit from it. On the other hand, to determine the worth of a coalition, cooperative game theory usually takes a pessimistic approach assuming what this coalition can guarantee itself irrespective of the behavior of agents outside the coalition. This means that downstream agents assume that agent j will take all the water it has access to up to the upper satiation point c j . Instead of making such assumptions, we directly impose axioms on the river situation (N, e, b) and we derive, from these axioms, unique solutions for the welfare distribution problem. By doing so, we avoid modeling the river situation as a cooperative game and the introduction of additional assumptions.
Remark: The problems above don't arise for a game defined under the principle that the worth of every coalition is the maximum welfare that such a coalition can attain by distributing all the water that is available for members of this coalition, also the water of (upstream) agents not belonging to the coalition, under the constraint of the uni-directionality of the water flows. We can make a remark on this, but I think it might trigger more questions by the referees, so after all I think it is better not to do so.
Since we developed axioms that are (i) based on water allocation principles, and (ii) can be combined to yield unique water allocation solutions, we turned water allocation principles into water allocation solutions and compensation schemes directly without a detour using cooperative games. This can help to solve real world river problems since the definition of the specific game that is used is not under discussion. For example, whereas in the game approach the ATS principle is often used 'on two levels' (once in defining the game and second in motivating the core lower bounds for that game), in this paper it is only used to define axioms directly on the river problem, i.e., on the inflows and benefit functions.
